By Oren Samet, Asia Sentinel, December 22, 2015
With the NLD’s landslide victory, have hardline monks lost their political power?
Yangon, Myanmar -- With the opposition National League for Democracy’s
(NLD) landslide victory in Myanmar’s Nov. 8 election, the enduring popularity
of its leader, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, was confirmed.
The results also constituted a strong popular rebuke of military rule, as the former generals of the incumbent Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) suffered an embarrassing defeat.
Ma Ba Tha leader Ashin Wirathu
But another group was also revealed to be less politically powerful than expected: the Buddhist nationalist organization known as Ma Ba Tha, or the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion. Led by Buddhist monks
who espouse a particularly vocal brand of anti-Muslim nationalism, Ma Ba
Tha had spent months lobbying for the enactment of legislation and policies aimed at “protecting” Buddhism.
Before the election, many observers were predicting that Ma Ba Tha’s growing clout could impact the electoral outcome. The organization had already proven itself to be a political power player, securing by mid-2015 the passage of four “Race and Religion Protection” bills restricting interfaith marriage, religious conversion and Muslim birthrates. Today, however, the monks of Ma Ba Tha have fallen out of the headlines.
Ma Ba Tha Weakened
As the NLD prepares to take the reins of government, Ma Ba Tha is in a decidedly weaker position than it was before the vote. And the dramatic
reversal of fortune is thanks, in large part, to the group’s own choices
during the campaign.
Though Buddhist monks are technically barred from direct participation in Myanmar politics, in the months leading up to election day, the monks of
Ma Ba Tha intervened repeatedly. Prominent Ma Ba Tha leaders, including
the notorious Wirathu, called on supporters to vote for candidates who
would safeguard Buddhism and traditional Burmese culture. In many
instances, they made it clear that this meant the ruling USDP.
Wirathu and others argued that the former generals could be better trusted
to protect Buddhism than Aung San Suu Kyi. At rallies in September
celebrating the passage of the “Race and Religion Protection” bills, Ma Ba
Tha monks urged supporters not to vote for the NLD, claiming that the
party was backed by “Islamists.”
Extremists Bet on USDP
For the NLD and other parties, Ma Ba Tha’s passionate support for the USDP was a cause for concern. Aung San Suu Kyi herself spoke out months before election day against Ma Ba Tha’s campaign rhetoric. The party even filed an official complaint with the Union Election Commission, claiming that Ma Ba
Tha’s politically charged statements violated restrictions on the use of religion
to influence the election.
But NLD leaders, wary of Ma Ba Tha’s influence, dared not cross the monks
on the issues they championed. Fearful of backlash, the party refrained from nominating a single Muslim candidate on its ticket, and NLD leaders sidestepped questions about anti-Muslim sentiment and policies, including persecution of vulnerable Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar’s Rakhine State.
In the end, however, Buddhist nationalism proved to be less of a political
force than many, including the NLD, had predicted. The NLD’s promise of change ended up being more alluring for voters than Buddhist nationalists’ pledges to preserve religion and culture.
Other Buddhist nationalists lose out as well
Not only did the USDP lose badly despite the strong backing of Ma Ba Tha,
other political parties that based their platforms on Buddhist nationalism performed particularly poorly. The National Development Party (NDP),
founded by a former presidential advisor, for instance, failed to win a single
seat in any legislative body nationwide, despite fielding hundreds of candidates.
After the results were confirmed, Ma Ba Tha announced its tepid support for
the new government, but cautioned that it would “not accept any insults to
race and religion.” Wirathu explicitly warned the NLD against attempts to
amend the “Race and Religion Protection” laws or the controversial 1982 Citizenship Law, which effectively bars Rohingya from full rights.
But with the USDP’s ranks in parliament decimated, the monks have lost a key ally in their efforts. Ma Ba Tha’s choice to actively denigrate the NLD during the campaign now leaves it in a difficult position, since the new parliament and government will be dominated by the party. While NLD leaders may have kowtowed to Ma Ba Tha prior to election day, they owe the group nothing now and, freed from the looming threat of electoral consequences, could feel emboldened to act against Ma Ba Tha’s preferences.
Ma Ba Tha not dead yet
Ma Ba Tha is by no means out of the game yet, however. Though not the electoral driver some predicted it to be, Buddhist nationalism remains a
potent political force. Many still fear the “Islamic invasion” and loss of
Burmese Buddhist culture that the monks warn about, and Ma Ba Tha
remains well organized and capable of capitalizing on these anxieties.
There also remains the potential for Ma Ba Tha to benefit from trouble in
the months to come. The monks have hinted at the potential for post-
election “turmoil,” and there is some precedent for such a scenario. Just
over two months after the 2012 by-elections that saw Aung San Suu Kyi
and over 40 other NLD candidates elected to parliament for the first time
since the transition to nominally civilian rule, violence between Buddhists
and Muslims exploded in Rakhine State, killing hundreds and displacing
nearly 140,000. The violence drove many in Myanmar into the embrace of Buddhist nationalism and presaged the rapid rise of Ma Ba Tha and similar groups.
Ultimately, though, Ma Ba Tha seems to have overplayed its hand in advance
of the vote. By siding so decisively with the USDP, the monks put all their
eggs in one basket, underestimating public support for Aung San Suu Kyi
and the NLD and overestimating their own political clout. Wirathu himself
claims that he was surprised by the election outcome, and he may well be wishing he had done a better job gauging the public mood.
The irony is that, while NLD parliamentarians did not champion the “Race
and Religion Protection” bills, they are far from the “Muslim lovers” that Ma
Ba Tha campaign rhetoric made them out to be. Had the group refrained
from taking sides in the election, its leaders might have been able to work
with NLD politicians, many of whom do not necessarily disagree with all of
Ma Ba Tha’s policy positions.
Instead, Ma Ba Tha priorities, including the passage of even more stringent
anti-Muslim legislation, may be substantially more difficult to achieve. Though an NLD government will be loath to challenge the still powerful group directly, Ma Ba Tha has certainly lost its privileged position in Myanmar politics and
now faces an unnecessary barrier entirely of its own making.
This article originally appeared in New Mandala, hosted by Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific affairs. Oren Samet is a Bangkok-based researcher and political analyst focusing on democracy and rights issues in Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on political dynamics in Myanmar.
With the NLD’s landslide victory, have hardline monks lost their political power?
Yangon, Myanmar -- With the opposition National League for Democracy’s
(NLD) landslide victory in Myanmar’s Nov. 8 election, the enduring popularity
of its leader, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, was confirmed.
The results also constituted a strong popular rebuke of military rule, as the former generals of the incumbent Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) suffered an embarrassing defeat.
But another group was also revealed to be less politically powerful than expected: the Buddhist nationalist organization known as Ma Ba Tha, or the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion. Led by Buddhist monks
who espouse a particularly vocal brand of anti-Muslim nationalism, Ma Ba
Tha had spent months lobbying for the enactment of legislation and policies aimed at “protecting” Buddhism.
Before the election, many observers were predicting that Ma Ba Tha’s growing clout could impact the electoral outcome. The organization had already proven itself to be a political power player, securing by mid-2015 the passage of four “Race and Religion Protection” bills restricting interfaith marriage, religious conversion and Muslim birthrates. Today, however, the monks of Ma Ba Tha have fallen out of the headlines.
Ma Ba Tha Weakened
As the NLD prepares to take the reins of government, Ma Ba Tha is in a decidedly weaker position than it was before the vote. And the dramatic
reversal of fortune is thanks, in large part, to the group’s own choices
during the campaign.
Though Buddhist monks are technically barred from direct participation in Myanmar politics, in the months leading up to election day, the monks of
Ma Ba Tha intervened repeatedly. Prominent Ma Ba Tha leaders, including
the notorious Wirathu, called on supporters to vote for candidates who
would safeguard Buddhism and traditional Burmese culture. In many
instances, they made it clear that this meant the ruling USDP.
Wirathu and others argued that the former generals could be better trusted
to protect Buddhism than Aung San Suu Kyi. At rallies in September
celebrating the passage of the “Race and Religion Protection” bills, Ma Ba
Tha monks urged supporters not to vote for the NLD, claiming that the
party was backed by “Islamists.”
Extremists Bet on USDP
For the NLD and other parties, Ma Ba Tha’s passionate support for the USDP was a cause for concern. Aung San Suu Kyi herself spoke out months before election day against Ma Ba Tha’s campaign rhetoric. The party even filed an official complaint with the Union Election Commission, claiming that Ma Ba
Tha’s politically charged statements violated restrictions on the use of religion
to influence the election.
But NLD leaders, wary of Ma Ba Tha’s influence, dared not cross the monks
on the issues they championed. Fearful of backlash, the party refrained from nominating a single Muslim candidate on its ticket, and NLD leaders sidestepped questions about anti-Muslim sentiment and policies, including persecution of vulnerable Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar’s Rakhine State.
In the end, however, Buddhist nationalism proved to be less of a political
force than many, including the NLD, had predicted. The NLD’s promise of change ended up being more alluring for voters than Buddhist nationalists’ pledges to preserve religion and culture.
Other Buddhist nationalists lose out as well
Not only did the USDP lose badly despite the strong backing of Ma Ba Tha,
other political parties that based their platforms on Buddhist nationalism performed particularly poorly. The National Development Party (NDP),
founded by a former presidential advisor, for instance, failed to win a single
seat in any legislative body nationwide, despite fielding hundreds of candidates.
After the results were confirmed, Ma Ba Tha announced its tepid support for
the new government, but cautioned that it would “not accept any insults to
race and religion.” Wirathu explicitly warned the NLD against attempts to
amend the “Race and Religion Protection” laws or the controversial 1982 Citizenship Law, which effectively bars Rohingya from full rights.
But with the USDP’s ranks in parliament decimated, the monks have lost a key ally in their efforts. Ma Ba Tha’s choice to actively denigrate the NLD during the campaign now leaves it in a difficult position, since the new parliament and government will be dominated by the party. While NLD leaders may have kowtowed to Ma Ba Tha prior to election day, they owe the group nothing now and, freed from the looming threat of electoral consequences, could feel emboldened to act against Ma Ba Tha’s preferences.
Ma Ba Tha not dead yet
Ma Ba Tha is by no means out of the game yet, however. Though not the electoral driver some predicted it to be, Buddhist nationalism remains a
potent political force. Many still fear the “Islamic invasion” and loss of
Burmese Buddhist culture that the monks warn about, and Ma Ba Tha
remains well organized and capable of capitalizing on these anxieties.
There also remains the potential for Ma Ba Tha to benefit from trouble in
the months to come. The monks have hinted at the potential for post-
election “turmoil,” and there is some precedent for such a scenario. Just
over two months after the 2012 by-elections that saw Aung San Suu Kyi
and over 40 other NLD candidates elected to parliament for the first time
since the transition to nominally civilian rule, violence between Buddhists
and Muslims exploded in Rakhine State, killing hundreds and displacing
nearly 140,000. The violence drove many in Myanmar into the embrace of Buddhist nationalism and presaged the rapid rise of Ma Ba Tha and similar groups.
Ultimately, though, Ma Ba Tha seems to have overplayed its hand in advance
of the vote. By siding so decisively with the USDP, the monks put all their
eggs in one basket, underestimating public support for Aung San Suu Kyi
and the NLD and overestimating their own political clout. Wirathu himself
claims that he was surprised by the election outcome, and he may well be wishing he had done a better job gauging the public mood.
The irony is that, while NLD parliamentarians did not champion the “Race
and Religion Protection” bills, they are far from the “Muslim lovers” that Ma
Ba Tha campaign rhetoric made them out to be. Had the group refrained
from taking sides in the election, its leaders might have been able to work
with NLD politicians, many of whom do not necessarily disagree with all of
Ma Ba Tha’s policy positions.
Instead, Ma Ba Tha priorities, including the passage of even more stringent
anti-Muslim legislation, may be substantially more difficult to achieve. Though an NLD government will be loath to challenge the still powerful group directly, Ma Ba Tha has certainly lost its privileged position in Myanmar politics and
now faces an unnecessary barrier entirely of its own making.
This article originally appeared in New Mandala, hosted by Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific affairs. Oren Samet is a Bangkok-based researcher and political analyst focusing on democracy and rights issues in Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on political dynamics in Myanmar.
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